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CARCINOGEN ROULETrE: THE GAME
PLAYED UNDER FIFRA
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)' requires that all pesticides be registered by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA)2 and prohibits the EPA from regis-
tering pesticides that have "unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment."' Once registered, pesticides are subject to continu-
ing review by the EPA,4 in part because many pesticides already on
the market may have been registered when data about their impacts
on health and the environment were very limited.5 To determine
whether it should cancel the registration of a pesticide, the EPA
again must apply an unreasonable-adverse-effects standard to bal-
ance the harm to public safety and the environment against the eco-
nomic benefits of continued usage.6 FIFRA authorizes the EPA to
suspend a pesticide's registration during cancellation proceedings if
the Administrator "determines that action is necessary to prevent an
imminent hazard" to human health.7 Nevertheless, the EPA is re-
luctant to invoke the imminent-hazard standard, as illustrated by the
example of the pesticide daminozide (Alar).8 Thus, during cancella-
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6 y (1988).
2. Id. § 136a(a).
3. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C).
4. See id. § 136a-l(a); see also id. § 136d(a).
5. FIFRA was amended in 1972 to require the reregistration of pesticides regis-
tered under prior rules. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
516 § 2, 86 Stat. 973, 984 (1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1 (1988)). See
infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
6. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1988). "[A]mong those factors to be taken into account
[are] the impact of such final action on production and prices of agricultural commodi-
ties, retail food prices, and otherwise on the agricultural economy . Id.
7. Id. § 136(d)(c)(1).
8. "Daminozide, sold under the trade name Alar, is a growth regulator used
predominantly in the apple industry." Note, Daminozide and the New England Apple Crop: A
NationalDefinition of"Safe"?, 12 VT. L. REV. 181, 181 n.1 (1987). Although daminozide is
useful to growers, it is widely thought to pose substantial health risks. See NATURAL RE-
SOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INTOLERABLE RISK: PESTICIDES IN OUR CHILDREN'S FOOD
(1989) [hereinafter NRDC] (describing NRDC efforts to determine whether pesticide
residues are a health risk to preschool children). In September 1985, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a ban on its use. Note, supra, at 186. But in January
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tion proceedings, a potentially dangerous chemical may continue to
be used, thereby posing health risks to unsuspecting consumers.
This Comment will explore the controversy over the cancella-
tion of pesticides. It will consider how significant the risk to human
health must be before an intermediate suspension as well as an
eventual cancellation can be effectuated. It also will consider
whether the registrant or the EPA should bear the burden of proof
after some threshold finding has been made as to the danger of a
registered pesticide. These are especially timely issues because the
EPA's difficulty in removing harmful pesticides from the market
under the current version of FIFRA increasingly undermines public
confidence in the Agency's ability to protect public health and
safety.
Part I of this paper introduces FIFRA by describing the compli-
cated and often inconsistent history of pesticide regulation. Part II,
using the Alar controversy as a case study, shows the great difficulty
that the EPA has had in removing "unreasonably dangerous" pesti-
cides from the market. Part III then evaluates whether this difficulty
is a necessary evil of according due process to manufacturers when
the EPA attempts to remove a pesticide from the market under a
risk-benefit balancing statute such as FIFRA. Finally, Part IV ana-
lyzes ways in which Congress could amend FIFRA to promote
greater public safety without sacrificing the due process owed to
pesticide registrants.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PESTICIDE REGULATION
Beginning with the enactment of the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act in 1947,1 pesticide manufacturers were
required to register their products prior to sale or movement in in-
terstate commerce.' ° FIFRA" required that manufacturers ade-
1986, the EPA rescinded its proposal in the face of opposition from a major daminozide
manufacturer and an expression of concern from the EPA's Scientific Advisory Panel
(SAP). Id. at 186-87. Interim measures allowed "the continued use of daminozide
pending further study [with registration] conditioned on a number of measures." Note,
supra, at 193.
9. Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163 (1947). Congress has amended the law several
times since then: Pub. L. No. 88-305, 78 Stat. 190 (1964); Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat.
973 (1972); Pub. L. No. 94-140, 89 Stat. 751 (1975); Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819
(1978); Pub. L. No. 96-539, 94 Stat. 3194 (1980); Pub. L. No. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2654
(1988).
10. See 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1200, 1201. Today, the law stipulates that
"[e]xcept as provided by this subchapter, no person in any State may distribute or sell to
any person any pesticide that is not registered under this subchapter." 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(a) (1988).
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quately label pesticides as to their proper application and content
before they were marketed-an attempt by Congress to make pesti-
cides both safe and effective. 2 By limiting its reach to labeling,
however, this initial attempt to curtail the hazards of pesticides was
modest at best.
The registration requirement did force the pesticide manufac-
turer to file with the Secretary of Agriculture a complete copy of the
label displayed on the pesticide,'" including directions for its use
and all claims made about the product. 14 The United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) also could order a description of the
results of tests conducted on the pesticide and a complete descrip-
tion of its formula.' 5 If the Secretary found the product unaccept-
able, either because it failed to live up to its manufacturer's claims
or because it did not meet the registration requirements, the Secre-
tary had to notify the registrant, "so as to afford the registrant an
opportunity to make the corrections necessary."' 6 The registrant
could refuse to make corrections and request registration despite
the Secretary's concerns. 7 In that event, "the Secretary [had to]
register the article, under protest,'" and such registration [had to]
be accompanied by a warning... to the registrant of the apparent
failure of the article to comply with the provisions of [the] Act."' 9
It was not until 1964 that Congress amended FIFRA to require
USDA approval before a pesticide product could legally be mar-
keted. ° The 1964 amendments also provided that the Secretary of
11. FIFRA broadened the regulation of pesticides previously regulated under The
Insecticides Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 331 (1910). 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1200.
12. The goal of FIFRA registration was to insure that pesticides carried labels bear-
ing information sufficient to make product use safe, easy, and effective. Comment, The
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972: A Compromise Approach, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q.,
277, 279 (1973); see H.R. REP. No. 313, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1947 U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. 1200.
13. FIFRA, Pub. L. No. 80-104, § 4a, 61 Stat. 163, 167 (1947). When Congress cre-
ated the EPA in 1970, it transferred the authority to implement FIFRA from the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the EPA. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1970, § 2(8)(i), 84 Stat. 2086, 2088 (1971), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1343, 1344
(1988).
14. FIFRA, Pub. L. No. 80-104, § 4a(3), 61 Stat. 163, 167 (1947).
15. Id. at §§ 4a(b), 4b, 61 Stat. at 167-68.
16. Id. § 4c, 61 Stat. at 168.
17. Id.
18. The USDA only issued a few products under "protest"-almost all were ap-
proved by the USDA before being registered. See Ferguson & Gray, 1988 FIFRA Amend-
mnents: A Major Step in Pesticide Regulation, 19 [News & Analysis] Envt'l L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10070, 10072 n.22 (Feb. 1989).
19. FIFRA, Pub. L. No. 80-104, § 4c, 61 Stat. at 168.
20. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10072 n.22; see FIFRA amendment, Pub. L.
1990] 977
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Agriculture could suspend the registration of a pesticide found to
pose an "imminent hazard," thereby halting its sale in interstate
commerce pending conclusion of cancellation proceedings.2 '
A. The 1972 Amendments
In response to growing concern over the hazards associated
with pesticide use as exemplified by the dichlorodiphenyl
trichloroethane (DDT) controversy, 22  Congress extensively
amended FIFRA in 1972.2 These amendments shifted the focus of
pesticide registration away from verification-of-label claims to con-
cern over public health and environmental protection. 24 The Fed-
eral Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972 (FEPCA)25
continued to use "product registration as a basis for control, but it
greatly expand[ed] registration, cancellation, and suspension crite-
ria to include consideration of factors beyond the mere efficiency of
the label." 2
6
As a result of the 1972 amendments, a manufacturer can regis-
No. 88-305, § 7, 78 Stat. 190, 193 (1964) (not codified) (providing an effective termina-
tion date of all existing registrations under protest).
21. FIFRA amendment, Pub. L. No. 88-305, § 3, 78 Stat. at 192 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964)) (superseded by 1972 amendments).
22. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(court considered availability of judicial remedy when administrative agency fails to act
promptly) and Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 590 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (statute requires Secretary of Agriculture to determine whether regulation
should be cancelled when there is substantial question concerning safety of pesticide),
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted environmental groups
standing to sue the EPA Administrator for his inaction on requests for suspension and
cancellation of dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethane (DDT). "The court recognized that...
the statute's minimum regulatory effectiveness could be rendered nonexistent through
the Administrator's discretionary power to refuse to take action" absent some provision
for consumer input. Comment, supra note 12, at 284-85. In Environmental Defense
Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (when the EPA initiated a cancellation
proceeding but did not order suspension, the reviewing court would remand entire rec-
ord), a case in which petitioners asked the court to order the Administrator to issue a
suspension of aldrin and dieldrin, and also in Ruckelshaus, the courts made it clear that
they would not hesitate to intervene if the Administrator shielded his inaction "behind
[the] overly broad and non-specific standards" of FIFRA. Comment, supra note 12, at
288. The judicial examination of FIFRA in these cases prompted Congress to amend
FIFRA in 1972 to authorize consumer input into the registration process and to provide
more definite standards for suspension and cancellation. See id. at 290-91.
23. See Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA), Pub. L. No. 92-516,
86 Stat. 973 (1972).
24. See Schatzow, The Regulator's Dilemma-No Smoking Gun, 2 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 28, 29 (1987).
25. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972). While FEPCA amended FIFRA, it did
not rename it.
26. Comment, supra note 12, at 291.
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ter a pesticide only if the label bears complete, clear, and truthful
information as to the capabilities of the product and directions for
its use2 7 and the manufacturer shows that the pesticide "can both
'perform its intended functions' and be 'used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice' without causing
'unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.' "28 In applying
this unreasonable-adverse-effects standard, the Administrator in de-
termining whether to grant registration must take into account the
"economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the
use" 29 based on information requested by the EPA.3 ° The Adminis-
trator also has the option of registering a product for restricted use
only." l If the pesticide "may generally cause, without additional
regulatory restrictions, unreasonable adverse effects on the environ-
ment, including injury to the applicator, '3 2 the Administrator may
impose additional limitations on the product's use, such as permit-
ting only certified applicators to apply the product.-" Whether the
administrator denies registration entirely or changes the product's
classification, however, the applicant or other interested persons are
entitled to a hearing, which can be a lengthy and cumbersome
process.3 4
These registration and classification provisions were made ap-
plicable to all pesticides, including those already on the market.35
The 1972 amendments directed the EPA to reregister all pesticides
previously registered under FIFRA using the same standards appli-
cable to new pesticides36 including the provisions regarding data
27. Id. at 292; see 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(q), 136a(c)(5) (1988).
28. Comment, supra note 12, at 292; see 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D) (1988).
29. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1988). The definition of "unreasonable adverse effects" in-
cludes these criteria. Id.
30. Id. §§ 136a(c)(1), 135a(c)(2).
31. Id. § 136a(d)(1)(A).
32. Id § 136a(d)(1)(C).
33. Id. § 136a(d)(1)(C)(i).
34. Spector, Regulation of Pesticides by the Environmental Protection Agency, 5 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 233, 236 (1976); see 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(6), 136a(d)(2), 136d(b) (1988). "[O]nly
the Administrator or directly affected manufacturer may obtain a cancellation or suspen-
sion hearing .... Comment, supra note 12, at 298. Nondiscretionary agency actions
"are judicially reviewable in the district courts .... " 7 U.S.C. § 136n(a) (1988).
35. See Spector, supra note 34, at 236. "These registration and cancellation guide-
lines do not apply only to new pesticides. The Act requires that all products previously
registered under FIFRA be re-registered and classified under the FEPCA standards
.... 1 Id.
36. 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1 (1988). Congress in 1972 did not specify how the EPA was to
conduct reregistration and the only mention of it was definitional-" [t]he term 'registra-
tion' includes reregistration." Id. § 136(z); see Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10073.
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submission, evaluation, and approval criteria .... ." Faced with the
need to reregister anywhere from 30,000 to 60,000 existing prod-
ucts, 8 the EPA envisioned the process as requiring review of ex-
isting product labels and summary files,39 along with any newly
submitted data to determine whether the use or toxicity of the pesti-
cide caused any unreasonable adverse effects on the environment
sufficient to warrant a restricted classification or cancellation.4 ° The
1972 amendments mandated completion of the reregistration and
classification process between October 1974 and October 19764"
and again, every five years thereafter.42 Needless to say, this two-
year time frame was far too ambitious.4 3
The task of identifying gaps in the data proved to be herculean
because "the EPA lacked a usable catalogue of the various studies
that had been submitted" 44 prior to 1970 when the EPA inherited
FIFRA from the USDA. 4' Even if data needs were identified, the
EPA's authority under the 1972 statute to require the submission of
data was unclear.46 Moreover, the 1972 law did not specify any pro-
cess for the EPA to follow in conducting an orderly reregistration of
the thousands of products on the market.47
More fundamentally, the 1972 amendments failed to address
the underlying problems of FIFRA-"lack of an explicitly stated
threshold danger level and agency inarticulateness. ' 4  As will be
discussed, the unreasonable-adverse-effects standard used to deter-
mine a pesticide's classification or cancellation is still vague. It is
uncertain how much environmental impact is necessary to create the
requisite adversity and "what weight the varying factors will com-
mand in the balancing process. '49
The imminent-hazard standard for immediate suspension is
37. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10073 n.23; see 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(2)(A),
136a(c)(5) (1988) (data requirements and evaluation and approval of applications for
registration).
38. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10073. Estimates as to the number of prod-
ucts subject to classification and/or registration in 1972 "vary over this range." Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 10072.
42. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(l) (1988).
43. One writer termed Congress' expectation "wildly over-optimistic." Ferguson &
Gray, supra note 18, at 10073.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 13.
46. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10073.
47. Id.
48. Comment, supra note 12, at 297.
49. Id.
980 [VOL. 49:975
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equally nebulous. 5° While the standard was defined more explicitly
under the 1972 amendments than it had been previously,"' immi-
nent-hazard determinations are so discretionary that, as one com-
mentator has remarked, "[the] statutory standard is so vague as to
amount to essentially no standard at all."'5 2 The problem with dis-
cretionary risk and benefit standards is that they are subject to
agency manipulation that may result in unnecessary delays in re-
moving a dangerous product from the market.
B. The 1978 Amendments: An Attempt at a More Realistic Time Frame
The 1978 FIFRA amendments5 a3 responded to the difficulties
that the EPA encountered under the unrealistic reregistration time
frame which Congress mandated in 19 72 .' The 1978 amendments
eliminated any specific deadline for completion of reregistration, re-
quiring instead that it be done "in the most expeditious manner
practicable." 55 Moreover, the amendments gave the Agency the au-
thority "to require data submissions, to provide for registrants to
share the cost of data generation, and to suspend the registrations
of products if registrants failed to respond to test data requirements
in a timely fashion."' 56 The amendments also directed the EPA to
focus on active ingredient data to expedite registrations.57 These
changes in FIFRA helped to facilitate the EPA's initial review or
identification of data gaps in studies conducted on approximately
200 active ingredients and allowed for the completion of data review
50. See 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1) (1988).
51. "Imminent hazard" is defined after the 1972 amendments as:
[A] situation which exists when the continued use of a pesticide during the time
required for [a] cancellation proceeding would be likely to result in unreasona-
ble adverse effects on the environment or will involve unreasonable hazard to
the survival of a species declared endangered or threatened by the Secretary
Id. § 136(). Previously, suspension was predicated upon an undefined "imminent haz-
ard" to the public. See 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1970) (definitional section of statute failed to
define "imminent hazard").
52. Spector, supra note 34, at 235 n.13.
53. FIFRA amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (1978).
54. SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, EPA, OFFICE OF
PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, FIFRA: IMPACT ON THE INDUSTRY, REPORT ON EXTENSION OF THE
FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT, S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 34-55 (1977). "EPA halted its reregistration effort in mid-1976 and went to
Congress to ask for help." Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10074.
55. FIFRA amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-396, § 8, 92 Stat. at 827 (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(g) (Supp. 11 1976)) (superseded by FIFRA Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-532, § 102, 102 Stat. 2654, 2655-67 (1988)).
56. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10074; see 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(B) (1988).
57. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10074.
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and standard setting for several chemicals. 58
The EPA's pace identifying data gaps-approximately twenty-
five products per year 59 -was still unacceptable considering the
mounting concern over discoveries of pesticide residues in food and
water across the nation.6" A major obstacle to accelerating the rere-
gistration process, however, was money and qualified scientists who
could identify the data gaps and evaluate the data that the regis-
trants submitted thereafter.6 ' According to one General Account-
ing Office study,6 2 additional resources were necessary even to
continue at a rate of twenty-five initial reviews and data gap identifi-
cations per year,63 and the necessary government funds simply were
not forthcoming.'
C. The 1988 Amendments: "FIFRA LITE",65
The 1988 amendments66 have been touted by some as "actually
go[ing] to the heart of the problem bedeviling pesticide regulation
.. "..,67 The amendments infuse more funding by allowing the EPA
to levy two different fees on those manufacturers who want to rere-
gister.6' The first fee is "[a] one-time 'active ingredient fee' [that]
ranges from $150,000 for major food and feed use pesticides to
nothing for pesticides used only for minor uses"'69 to be paid by
producers of products identified for reregistration. The other fee,
one that the EPA can levy annually, is a $425 'maintenance fee' for
58. Id. at 10074; see HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL INSEC-
TICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 939,
100th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1988).
59. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10075.
60. Id. at 10075 n.54.
61. Id. at 10075.
62. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PESTICIDES-EPA's FORMIDABLE TASK TO ASSESS
AND REGULATE THEIR RISKS 45, 86-125 (1986) [hereinafter GAO].
63. Id. at 45; see also Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10075.
64. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10075. The EPA's pesticide program suffered
greatly at the hands of those who did not want to raise taxes but did want to spend
government money on other programs. In 1980, the EPA's pesticide program had 829
employees and $45 million in expenditures. In 1985, the program was cut down to
about 600 employees with $44 million in expenditures. GAO, supra note 62, at 45; see
also Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10075.
65. "Critics have dubbed the changes 'FIFRA Lite' and 'another excuse to postpone
important issues.' " Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10075 (arguing that the 1988
amendments will have a substantial impact).
66. FIFRA Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2654 (1988).
67. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10076.
68. Id. at 10077, see 7 U.S.C. § 136a-l(i) (1988).
69. d. at 10076; see 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1(i)(1)-(2) (1988).
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each registration.7"
The 1988 amendments also made significant changes concern-
ing indemnification when a registration was suspended or can-
celled.7" The amendments provide that indemnification no longer
will be paid from the EPA's operating budget;72 indemnification
henceforth will be limited to end users and is to be paid from the
"Judgment Fund," reserved for paying claims against the federal
government. 73 This will unencumber the money that the EPA ur-
gently needs for data review, and allay the fears of those who be-
lieved that "the possibility [of] having to make indemnity
payments, 74 out of its own operating budget would "discourage the
EPA from aggressive regulation."7 5
The 1988 amendments will require registrants to conduct more
preliminary work to show the ramifications of their product's use on
the environment. 76 The EPA cannot take these "first cut" tests as
dispositive17 and, therefore, will continue to have to conduct testing
and review on its own.78 Nonetheless, the preliminary testing re-
quired of the registrants will provide the EPA with initial data from
which to draw information about a pesticide before the EPA begins
its review.
Some commentators have deemed these most recent amend-
ments to FIFRA to be "extremely significant" 79 and "a major step in
pesticide regulation ' '8b because they are "designed to speed up rer-
egistration and remove potential threats to EPA's budget that could
thwart its efforts to protect the public."'" Nevertheless, an ineffi-
cient hearing process, the lack of any definite threshold risk level at
which a pesticide should be taken off the market pending determina-
70. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10077; see 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1(i)(5) (1988). For
a detailed exposition of how, when, and on whom both the "active ingredient fee" and
"maintenance fee" are to be levied, see Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10076-78.
71. See Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10078.
72. Note, however, that although the EPA was liable, "most of these claims were
eventually paid from sources other than EPA's operating budget." Id.
73. Id; see 7 U.S.C. § 136m(b)(3) (1988). See generally 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982) (ap-
propriating funds for judgments).
74. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10079.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 10078 (1988 amendments restructure Agency's burden, shifting many
registration tasks to registrant); 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1 (1988).
77. Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10078 (the EPA must make final regulatory
assessment).
78. Id. (the EPA still must review the data to determine whether it is sufficient).
79. Id. at 10070.
80. Id.
81. Id
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tions concerning potential risks, and an undue evidentiary burden
on the EPA, still make FIFRA highly inadequate as a national stan-
dard to promote public health and a safe environment. The contro-
versy surrounding the reregistration of Aar exemplifies this
inadequacy.
II. ALAR AND FIFRA's INEFFICIENCY
The pesticide daminozide, better known as Aar, is a growth
regulator that the apple industry has used extensively since its regis-
tration on the market in 1968.82 While this chemical allows apples
to stay on the trees longer, reduces crop loss due to preharvest
dropping, prolongs the shelf life in apples, and promotes a uniform
color and firmness,'- studies have shown that it is potentially carci-
nogenic, especially among young children. 4 Daminozide, a sys-
temic pesticide, cannot be washed or peeled off because it
penetrates the meat of the apple.8 5 Moreover, the processing of ap-
ples into apple juice or applesauce converts daminozide into an
even more potent carcinogen, unsymmetrical 1,1 dimethylhydrazine
(UDMH). 6
In September 1985, the EPA first proposed banning damino-
zide based on studies conducted between 1973 and 1984, which re-
vealed that daminozide had oncogenic (tumor forming) effects on
laboratory rodents.8 7 The registrant, Uniroyal, however, argued
82. Daminozide was first registered under FIFRA in 1963 as a plant growth regulator
for use on chrysanthemums. It also was used on peanuts, grapes, cherries, pears, and
some vegetables. Schatzow, supra note 24, at 30.
83. Id. Daminozide is unique in that there is no comparably effective pesticide. Id.
84. See generally NRDC, supra note 8 (a detailed analysis of children's exposure to
pesticides in food, including daminozide in apples, and the potential hazard that the
residues pose to children). Pesticides pose a particularly serious threat to young chil-
dren because they typically consume fruits and vegetables at a significantly greater rate
than adults, and they frequently are more susceptible than adults to the effects of carcin-
ogens. Id. at 1.
85. Note, supra note 8, at 183 (citing A. Heier, EPA Press Release 3 (Jan. 22, 1986)).
86. Id. at 185. "One expert stated that carcinogenicity studies suggest that UDMH
[unsymmetrical 1,1 dimethylhydrazine] is several hundred times more carcinogenic than
daminozide." Id. at 185 n.31.
87. Id. at 185. The EPA relied upon five studies conducted between 1973 and 1984
to conclude that daminozide and its metabolite UDMH are carcinogens. These studies
were:
(a) Toth, B. 1973. 1,l-Dimethylhydrazine (unsymmetrical) carcinogenesis in
mice. Light microscopic and ultrastructural studies on neoplastic blood ves-
sels. Journal of the National Cancer Institute 50: 181-87.
(b) Toth, B., et aL, 1977. Induction of tumors in mice with the herbicide suc-
cinic acid 2,2-dimethylhydrazide. Cancer Research 37: 3497-500.
(c) Toth, B., 1977. The large bowel carcinogenic effects of hydrazines and re-
[VOL. 49:975
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that there were too many uncertainties in these studies "to draw sci-
entifically responsible conclusions concerning the risks of damino-
zide."' s These scientific uncertainties included data gaps in existing
cancer studies and a flawed extrapolation of data over different
routes of exposure. 9
The EPA's Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) 9' echoed these con-
cerns about the studies.9 The SAP conceded that the studies raise
concerns about the potential oncogenicity of daminozide; nonethe-
less, the SAP determined that the available animal studies were not
a sufficient basis on which to assess human health risks.9 2 The
panel, however, criticized the EPA's failure to come up with addi-
tional testing of daminozide in a more timely manner.93 The USDA
also commented on the animal studies and the conclusions that the
EPA drew from them.94 The USDA stated that the EPA had under-
estimated daminozide's benefits in its risk-benefit assessment and
lated compounds occurring in nature and in the environment. Cancer 40: 2427-
431.
(d) Nat'l Cancer Inst., 1978. Bioassay of Daminozide for Possible Carcinoge-
nicity. United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public
Health Service. (NCI Carcinogenesis Technical Report Series No. 83; DHEW
Publication No. NIH 78-1333).
(e) Haun, C.C., et aL, 1984. Chronic Inhalation Toxicity of Unsymmetrical
Dimethylhydrazine; Oncogenic Effects. Air Force Aerospace Medical Research
Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
Id. at 184 n.29 (quoting R. Abrams, Petition for Establishment of Zero Tolerances, Pesti-
cide Tolerances for Daminozide 17 (EPA July 1, 1986)).
88. Schatzow, supra note 24, at 63.
89. Id.
90. The SAP is a seven-member panel of scientists, nominated by the National Insti-
tutes of Health and the National Science Foundation, empowered to advise the EPA as
to the impact on health and the environment of pesticides that the EPA proposes to
suspend and/or cancel. The SAP was established and empowered pursuant to 7 U.S.C.
§ 136w(d) (1988).
91. Schatzow, supra note 24, at 63. Curiously, the problems raised by the SAP as to
the reliability of the studies were considered at length by the EPA before it proposed the
cancellation of daminozide in 1985. Id. at 64. "[I]nternal deliberations.., on exposure
complexities as well as whether the oncogenicity studies from the 1970s were technically
adequate grounds for a special review date back to 1978 .... Id. The EPA proposed
the cancellation of daminozide despite the scientific uncertainties, but later changed its
position when the SAP recommended that daminozide not be cancelled because of the
same scientific uncertainties. This raises the question "How much scientific uncertainty
is too much [for purposes of regulating pesticides]?" Id.
92. 51 Fed. Reg. 12889 (1986); see also Note, supra note 8. at 192 (citing FIFRA SAP,
Review of a Set of Scientific Issues Being Considered by EPA in Connection with the
Special Review of Daminozide (Oct. 4, 1985)).
93. Id.
94. Note, supra note 8, at 192. FIFRA allows the USDA to comment on the EPA's
notice of pesticide cancellation and to provide an analysis of the effect of such cancella-
tion on the agricultural economy. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1988).
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urged the EPA to reconsider the proposed cancellation.95
The EPA did reconsider its proposed cancellation of damino-
zide, postponing a final decision on the cancellation pending further
study.9 6 Until the new data were available, daminozide remained on
the market subject to certain interim regulatory measures.97 These
measures included limiting the amount of daminozide that growers
could apply to their apple crops and reducing tolerance levels for
residues found in both raw and processed apples from thirty parts
per million to twenty parts per million.9"
The ramifications of the EPA having raised serious health con-
cerns about daminozide while allowing it to remain on the market
were many. Both Maine and Massachusetts proposed setting toler-
ance levels on daminozide residues much lower than those set by
the EPA.9 9 Many apple growers stopped using daminozide, de-
creasing Uniroyal's sales of Alar by about seventy-five percent' 0"
and consumers became wary of apples and apple products.' ° '
Moreover, the situation highlighted FIFRA's inconsistent and ineffi-
cient nature-had daminozide been a new chemical, it would not
have been allowed on the market unless the registrant could submit
additional data to show that it did not pose a health hazard. 10 2
In January 1989, the EPA announced that it intended to initiate
cancellation proceedings for daminozide based on interim results of
toxicology studies submitted by Uniroyal.10 3 The cancellation pro-
cess ordinarily runs from eighteen months to several years, depend-
ing upon whether the registrant contests the EPA's actions.'"
While the preliminary data were sufficient to warrant beginning the
95. 51 Fed. Reg. 12889 (1986).
96. Note, supra note 8, at 193.
97. Id.
98. 51 Fed. Reg. 12889 (1986). Although the EPA proposed to reduce the residue
levels from 30 parts per million (ppm) to 20 ppm in April 1986, it did not actually re-
duce the tolerance level until January 16, 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 1914 (1987).
99. Note supra note 8, at 186, 211-15.
100. Bad Apples, CONSUMER REPORTS, May 1989, at 288.
101. Schatzow, supra note 24, at 63.
102. Aidala, Apple Alarm: Public Concern About Pesticide Residues in Fruits and Vegetables, in
CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE REP. FOR CONGRESS 7 (Mar. 10, 1989). For a new pesticide,
the burden of proof is on the registrant to show that the pesticide's intended use will not
pose an unreasonable risk. Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C), (D) (1988). Due to the fact that
Alar already was registered, the burden of proof was on the EPA to show that the pesti-
cide risked "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." Id. § 136d(b). Accord-
ing to the EPA, the studies were not sufficiently reliable to meet the evidentiary
threshold. Aidala, supra, at 7.
103. Aidala, supra note 102, at 7.
104. Id. at 8; see also infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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cancellation proceedings, once the results were submitted in final
form, in the EPA's opinion the data did not reveal an imminent haz-
ard to human health, the standard sufficient to warrant a suspension
of a pesticide's registration pending cancellation.'" 5 According to a
study by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), however,
daminozide does pose the requisite imminent risk.'0 6
The NRDC study on pesticide residues in foods found that
these residues posed an intolerable risk to children.' 0 7 The NRDC
determined that 4700 to 6000 preschool children, out of a popula-
tion of 22 million (or 240 in 1 million children), eventually will de-
velop cancer from daminozide in their first 6 years of life.' 0 s By
contrast, the EPA calculated that during an eighteen-month expo-
sure period (the average period of time needed to remove a pesti-
cide from the market), only nine in one million children will get
cancer due to daminozide, a number approximately twenty-five
times lower than the NRDC estimate.'0 9 The disparity between the
NRDC's and the EPA's risk characterization results from different
exposure periods-six years versus eighteen months-and different
assumptions about dose-response and exposure levels." 0
The NRDC based its dose-response factor on the same tests
and extrapolations that the FIFRA SAP rejected in 1985.1" Accord-
ing to the NRDC scientists, however, the studies that extrapolated a
child's health risk through ingestion of daminozide from a rat's risk
through inhalation of daminozide were valid." 2 By contrast, the
EPA used figures from a two-year ongoing daminozide study."' Ac-
cording to the NRDC, the EPA's interim results greatly underesti-
mate the actual risk because some of daminozide's effects have not
yet surfaced. 1 4
For the exposure level, NRDC used a 1985-1986 USDA survey
of 2000 persons to determine how many apples children eat. The
EPA rejected this data because the sample was small and the re-
105. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c) (1988); Aidala, supra note 102, at 8.
106. Aidala, supra note 102, at 10.
107. See generally NRDC, INTOLERABLE RISK: PESTICIDES IN OUR CHILDREN'S
FooD/SuMMARY (Feb. 27, 1989) [hereinafter NRDC/SuMMARY].
108. Id.; see Roberts, Aiar: The Numbers Game, 245 SCIENCE 1430 (July, Aug., Sept.
1989) (comparison of the NRDC and EPA reports on the effects of daminozide).
109. Roberts, supra note 108, at 1430.
110. Id.
111. See supra note 87.
112. See NRDC/SuMMARY, supra note 107.
113. Roberts, supra note 108, at 1430.
114. Id.
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sponse rate was only 65 percent."15 Instead, the EPA used a 1977-
1978 USDA food survey of 30,000 persons. The NRDC, in turn,
discounted this data because fruit consumption has increased thirty
percent from 1977 to 1985.116
Despite the NRDC's and the EPA's disagreements as to under-
lying assumptions, scientifically, the two risk assessments are not far
apart. 1 7 "A factor of 25 difference is well within the range of what
two reasonable people using similar data and reasonable assump-
tions might come up with.""" Nevertheless, for purposes of risk
assessment, this disparity can mean the difference between pulling a
dangerous product off the market and saving lives, or not. The nine
in one million ratio was not enough for the EPA to declare that
daminozide posed an imminent hazard to human health." 9 The
question remains as to how great the risk to human health must be
before the EPA can suspend the registration of a pesticide pending
cancellation. Must 1 in 100,000 people be at risk? 1 in 10,000? 1 in
1000? Or perhaps this should be decided on a case-by-case ap-
proach or by use of an incidence approach (for example, one case
per year per source)? The level of risk at which a registration can be
suspended is left largely to Agency discretion and conseqtiently, so
are human lives.
On May 24, 1989, after Uniroyal submitted its toxicological
studies in final form, the EPA issued a Preliminary Determination
and Draft Cancellation Notice that proposed the cancellation of
daminozide food crop use registrations under FIFRA.' 2 ° In early
June 1989, Uniroyal, the sole manufacturer of daminozide products
registered for food use, signed an agreement with the EPA to "im-
mediately stop sales and recall all stocks of food use daminozide in-
cluding those held by users."' 2 ' The Agency considered this action
along with an apple industry trade association's public recommen-
dation that growers cease the use of daminozide as sufficiently
analogous to a final cancellation action and, therefore, proposed the
reduction or revocation of all tolerances for daminozide.' 22
Although the health risks from daminozide are diminishing, the
problems with FIFRA regarding reregistration of pesticides remain.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 51.
120. 54 Fed. Reg. 22558 (1989).
121. 54 Fed. Reg. 37280 (1989).
122. Id.
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III. FIFRA's INEFFICIENCY: A NECESSARY EVIL?
The problems associated with FIFRA's reregistration process
demonstrated by the Alar controversy include the lack of any defi-
nite threshold level at which a pesticide is deemed to pose a risk of
unreasonable adverse effects or an imminent hazard and an ineffi-
cient hearing process.
A. The Discretionary Standards
The unreasonable-adverse-effects standard used to determine a
pesticide's cancellation takes into account the "economic, social and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide."' 23
According to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckleshaus,' 24 this standard obli-
gates the EPA Administrator to issue a cancellation notice "and
thereby initiate the administrative process whenever there is a sub-
stantial question about the safety of a registered pesticide."' 25 The
unreasonable-adverse-effects standard has been described as being
even less rigorous than the reason-to-believe standard (at which
threshold many agencies begin enforcement proceedings) 26 and
analytically, little more than "a determination... that adjudicatory
proceedings will commence."' 27 The same court, however, has de-
clared that the Administrator need not initiate such cancellation
proceedings when he or she believes that there is "scientific uncer-
tainty as to the danger of a particular pesticide combined perhaps
with the economic impact of cancellation on 'agricultural commodi-
ties, retail food prices and... the agricultural economy.' ",128
Similarly, the Administrator is not obligated under FIFRA
to suspend a pesticide's registration when scientific opinion is
divided.' 29 The imminent-hazard-to-human-health standard neces-
sary for suspension is much more stringent than the unreasonable-
adverse-affects standard used to determine cancellation, and it calls
for more than a "substantial question of safety:" there must be a
"substantial likelihood that serious harm will be experienced during
123. 40 C.F.R. § 154.26 (1989); see 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1988).
124. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
125. Id. at 594.
126. National Coalition Against Misuse of Pesticides v. EPA, 867 F.2d 636, 643 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); see also FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239-43 (1980).
127. 867 F.2d at 644 (quoting FTC, 449 U.S. at 241-42).
128. Id. at 642.
129. Id. at 644.
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[the cancellation proceedings]."' 3 ° In the case of daminozide, the
EPA in its discretion did not regard the nine in one million ratio as a
substantial enough likelihood that serious harm would result when
balanced against daminozide's benefits.''
Both the unreasonable-adverse-effects and imminent-hazard
standards require the EPA to conduct a risk and benefit analysis to
determine how much risk is acceptable when balanced against the
benefits of a pesticide-"a subjective judgment that is difficult to
make even in the absence of [scientific] uncertainty." '"12 Critics of
risk assessment and risk management13 3 statutes such as FIFRA ar-
gue that it is repugnant to deliberately trade off lives and health
against economic costs and that the public deserves "more than
'reasonable' protection from carcinogens and other hazards."'13 4
Conversely, it may be inappropriate to pull a pesticide off the mar-
ket with the attendant economic consequences when the risks are
uncertain and the alternatives are either untested or nonexistent.
There is also the concern that twenty years down the road, the rem-
edy may be found to be more toxic than the pesticide it replaced.
To afford pesticide manufacturers the process due under FIFRA,
the Administrator must take these social and economic factors into
account when trying to deal with a public health hazard. Unfortu-
nately, under the current FIFRA, the cancellation or suspension of a
registered pesticide is governed by overly broad and imprecise stan-
dards that can be manipulated by political ideologies and that shift
with the tide of public sentiment. The result is inconsistent and
inefficient pesticide regulation that leaves the public confused and
uncertain about the health risks to which they may be exposed by
ordinary consumption of pesticide-treated fruits and vegetables,
and suspicious of a regulatory system that sets no definite threshold
on health risks imposed on the public. The same concerns voiced
eighteen years ago in Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA 13' are
130. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
131. See Roberts, supra note 108, at 1430.
132. Schatzow, supra note 24, at 66.
133. In very general terms, risk assessment characterizes potential health effects of
human exposure to environmental hazards. By contrast, risk management is an agency
decision-making process that considers political, social, economic, and engineering in-
formation together with risk-related information to analyze regulatory options and to
select an appropriate response to a hazard. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, COMM'N ON LIFE SCI.,
COMM. ON INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, RISK As-
SESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 18-19 (1983).
134. Doniger, The Gospel of Risk Management: Should We Be Converted? 14 [News & Anal-
ysis] ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10222, 10222 (June 1984).
135. 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see supra note 22.
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echoed today-FIFRA needs more concrete legislative guidelines.
B. The Hearing Process
An inefficient hearing process exacerbates the problem of
highly subjective discretionary standards. Even if the Administrator
does initiate cancellation proceedings, the process of taking a pesti-
cide off the market can take four to eight years.' 3 6 After registrants
submit comments and new data to the EPA for a risk and benefit
balancing analysis known as Special Review' 3 7 (a two- to four-year
process), the registrant then may request an administrative hearing
to challenge the Special Review decision 3 8 (another two- to four-
year process). Unless the pesticide's registration has been sus-
pended or the registrant voluntarily withdraws the pesticide from
the market, the pesticide remains on the market through both of
these procedures.' 3 9 The registrant still may challenge the EPA's
final ruling in federal court. 140
Due to this lengthy Special Review and cancellation process, it
often has taken many years to remove a dangerous pesticide from
the market.' 4 ' Perhaps even more disturbing is the amount of time
it takes to suspend a pesticide's registration while cancellation pro-
cedures are being completed. Even if the Administrator has met the
stringent burden of showing that continued use of the pesticide
poses an imminent hazard to the public health when balanced
against the benefits of the pesticide's continued use,'4 2 the Adminis-
136. EPA, Highlights of EPA's Draft Legislative Proposal 2 (July 18, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Highlights].
137. See 40 C.F.R. § 154.1 (1989).
138. See 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1988).
139. See id. at § 136d(a)(1).
140. Highlights, supra note 136, at 2; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 136d(c)(4), 136n (1988).
141. Besides daminozide, these dangerous pesticides include: DBCP (dibro-
mochloropropane), a soil fumigant used on pineapple fields that through ground water
contamination can cause cancer and birth defects; carbon tetrachloride, a post-harvest
fumigant used on barley, corn, oats, rice, rye, and wheat that can cause tumors and have
a toxic effect on the liver and kidneys; and all pesticides containing captan, an active
ingredient used in the treatment of pests on many fruits including apples, apricots,
blackberries, and blueberries, and which can cause cancer. EPA, OFFICE OF PESTICIDE
PROGRAMS, AND REGISTRATION STANDARDS IN THE REREGISTRATION PROGRAM, 1-4, 1-9, 1-
10 (Dec. 1989) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE STATUS OF CHEMICALS IN THE SPECIAL RE-
VIEW PROGRAM]; EPA, OFFICE OF PESTICIDES: How LONG AND How RESOLVED (Oct.
1989) [hereinafter SPECIAL REVIEW SUSPENSION/CANCELLATION HEARINGS]. It took the
EPA over seven years to remove each of these substances from the market; in the case of
DBCP, the hearing process alone took over seven years. REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
CHEMICALS IN THE SPECIAL REVIEW PROGRAM, supra, at 1-10.
142. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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trator still must issue a cancellation order. 143 To issue a cancella-
tion order, the EPA must prepare a written assessment of the risks
and benefits of a pesticide's continued use and initiate cancellation
procedures.' 44 The EPA also must give the registrants an opportu-
nity for an expedited hearing in the case of a nonemergency suspen-
sion order.' 45 As evidenced by the case of daminozide, this entire
suspension process can take eighteen to twenty-four months to com-
plete, depending upon how quickly the EPA acts.
Under FIFRA, the process of suspending or cancelling the re-
gistrations of existing pesticides unnecessarily prolongs public ex-
posure to dangerous pesticides. Providing the opportunity for an
expedited hearing prior to issuing a suspension order and retaining
a pesticide on the market pending the completion of a cancellation
hearing goes beyond what is required by due process. 146 Presuma-
bly, the registrant of a registered pesticide has a property interest in
that registration sufficient to invoke the protection of the United
States Constitution's fifth amendment due process clause. Never-
theless, the Constitution does not create this property interest; 147 it
is created by FIFRA and the rules and regulations promulgated by
the EPA pursuant to FIFRA.141 Just as the property interest in a
welfare recipient's welfare payments, 149 or the property interest in a
horse trainer's license' 50 is created and defined in statutory terms,
so too is a registrant's interest in his or her existing pesticide regis-
tration created and defined by FIFRA and the EPA. Accordingly,
FIFRA and the applicable EPA regulations entitle a registrant to
continued registration of a pesticide, unless that pesticide causes an
imminent hazard or unreasonable adverse effects to human health
or the environment.
143. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1988).
144. Highlights, supra note 136, at 3.
145. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(2) (1988).
146. See infra notes 148-179 and accompanying text.
147. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests.., are
not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created... by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understand-
ings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlements.").
148. For cases addressing the nature of property subject to due process protection,
see Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (plaintiff's property interest in a statutorily
regulated horse trainer's license was sufficient to invoke due process protection); Perry
v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (stating that if a person's claim to a benefit is
supported by rules or mutual understandings, that interest is subject to due process
protection); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that driver's licenses are
property interests which cannot be disposed of without due process protection).
149. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
150. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 64.
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Although the opportunity to be heard usually is afforded before
the Agency acts, 15 1 the Supreme Court has recognized that "sum-
mary administrative action may be justified in emergency situations"
such as those that create an imminent hazard to public health and
safety.'52 As one commentator noted,
When the contaminated food or a misbranded drug is
about to be sold, or the gas storage tank likely to explode,
the luxury of a hearing simply cannot be afforded. In the
emergency case, the emergency itself is complete justifica-
tion for summary action. The right to be heard must give
way to the need for the immediate protection of the
public. 153
While summary administrative action most often is allowed in situa-
tions that involve a danger to human health, the emergency ex-
ception also has been applied in tax cases due to the urgent need for
the government to secure its revenues.'
55
Under FIFRA, a pesticide registration may be suspended with-
out a predeprivation hearing if the Administrator determines that an
emergency exists.' 56 A registrant, however, is afforded the opportu-
nity for a presuspension hearing to determine whether an imminent
hazard exists when, in the discretion of the Administrator, the immi-
nent hazard does not create an emergency situation.' 57 This immi-
nent hazard dichotomy is unnecessary for purposes of due process;
the use of a pesticide should be considered to pose an emergency
situation sufficient to justify summary administrative action when-
ever its "continued use.., during the time required for cancellation
proceeding would be likely to result in unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment [which includes man] or will involve unreasona-
151. See 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1988).
152. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 300
(1981) (statute authorizing immediate cessation order against surface mining when it
posed imminent danger to public health and safety prior to a predeprivation hearing did
not violate due process).
153. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 5.10, at 222 (2d ed. 1984) (citing North
American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Adams v. Milwaukee, 228
U.S. 572 (1913); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1947); Newburgh v.
Park Filling Station, Inc., 298 N.Y. 649 (1948)).
154. Id. § 5.10, at 223.
155. Id. (citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 598 (1931)).
156. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(3) (1988). This emergency provision was designed to pro-
vide an exception to the presuspension hearing requirement in those cases in which this
hearing may take a month or more to complete. Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1353
(9th Cir. 1988).
157. See Love, 858 F.2d at 1352.
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ble hazard to the survival of a species declared endangered or
threatened."' t 8 Like the statutory provision at issue in Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,'59 which requires im-
mediate total or partial cessation of a surface mine operation
whenever the Secretary determines that the operation "creates an
imminent danger to the health or safety of the public,"' 60 the immi-
nent-hazard standard under FIFRA is an attempt to reach an accom-
modation between the private interest affected and the
"governmental interest in protecting the public health and safety
and the environment from imminent danger."' t6'
Even in nonemergency situations, once the Administrator has
determined that a pesticide meets or is likely to meet the unreasona-
ble-adverse-effects standard sufficient to cancel a pesticide registra-
tion, the Administrator could suspend a pesticide registration
during the cancellation hearing without denying due process to the
registrant. The Supreme Court only infrequently has required a full
evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of an existing property
right.'62 In Matthews v. Eldridge,'6 ' the Court recognized that " 'due
process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."'" To
determine the process due an owner prior to the deprivation of his
or her property right, a court must analyze the governmental and
private interests affected by the deprivation.' 6 5 The Matthews Court
describes three criteria that should be considered in this analysis.
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural require-
158. This is the definition of "imminent hazard." 7 U.S.C. § 136(1) (1988).
159. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
160. 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1988).
161. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 300.
162. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (recognizing that the inter-
est of a welfare recipient in uninterrupted benefits outweighs the state's interest in
avoiding the extra financial and administrative burdens of a pretermination hearing).
163. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
164. Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
The Matthews Court held that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to the termi-
nation of disability benefits. Id.
165. Id. at 335.
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ment would entail.' 66
Under this test, Congress could permit or require that a regis-
trant's pesticide registration be suspended pending a cancellation
hearing. First, the private interest that will be affected by the sus-
pension of a pesticide registration for the purposes of due process is
the registrant's interest in the uninterrupted sale or distribution of
the pesticide pending completion of the cancellation process.
167
Although suspending the registration of a pesticide during the time
it takes for a cancellation hearing may impose a financial burden on
the registrant, the Administrator can reimburse the registrant for
losses suffered "by reason of suspension or cancellation of the regis-
tration. '  Unlike depriving a possibly "eligible [welfare] recipient
of the very means by which to live while he waits,"' 6 9 an incorrect
decision regarding the suspension of a registrant's pesticide regis-
tration pending cancellation can be repaired.' 70
166. Id
167. Although the suspension or cancellation of a pesticide registration impacts the
farmers who use the pesticide and the dealers and distributors who sell it, this impact is
too remote; it is the registrant's interest in the pesticide registration that is a protected
property interest for purposes of due process. FIFRA does provide for indemnification
under certain circumstances to end users, dealers, and distributors who have suffered
losses by reason of suspension or cancellation of a pesticide registration. 7 U.S.C.
§ 136m (1988). FIFRA also allows persons "adversely affected" by cancellation to re-
quest a hearing. Id. § 136d(b). These provisions, however, do not create an individual
entitlement in a pesticide registration that cannot be removed except for cause. Absent
such an entitlement, end users, dealers, and distributors do not have an interest in a
pesticide registration that is protected by due process. See O'Bannon v. Town Court
Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 787 (1980) (Medicaid patients did not have a protected
property interest in a health care facility that would entitle them to a hearing before the
government could decertify that facility); Nuclear Transport & Storage, Inc. v. United
States, 890 F.2d 1348, 1354 (6th Cir. 1989) (operator of facility that stored unenriched
uranium feed material owned by public utilities was not deprived of property for pur-
poses of due process by the government's decision to provide free storage of
unenriched uranium under feed usage agreements).
168. 7 U.S.C. § 136m(a)(l)(C) (1988).
169. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
170. After Matthews v. Eldridge, pretermination hearings are not required when mone-
tary benefits are at stake, absent a situation involving welfare entitlements. See B.
ScHwARTZ, supra note 153, § 5.25, at 256; see also supra note 164. The Supreme Court
also has held that deprivation of a property interest in a license does not require a
pretermination hearing. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979); see also Keystone Cable-
Vision Corp. v. FCC, 464 F. Supp. 740, 744 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (even if a property interest
had been conferred by electrical permits, available postrevocation hearing procedures
were adequate for purposes of due process). One might argue that the stigma of sus-
pension cannot be readily undone and that therefore, the opportunity for a presuspen-
sion hearing should be afforded even in a nonemergency suspension; however, any
stigma suffered as a result of a nonemergency suspension when the registration ulti-
mately was not cancelled probably would not constitute a deprivation sufficient to in-
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Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of this property inter-
est is slight. Prior to its decision to cancel, the EPA conducts a
highly intensive and technical Special Review process lasting ap-
proximately two to four years.' 71 Rarely, if ever, has a Special Re-
view decision to cancel a pesticide been overturned after an
administrative hearing or judicial review.' 72
Finally, the government's interest in suspending a pesticide re-
gistration pending the cancellation hearing is very strong. FIFRA's
current practice of allowing a pesticide to remain on the market
pending the completion of a cancellation hearing gives the regis-
trant a strong disincentive to complete expeditiously the cancella-
tion hearing. A registrant might delay the completion of a hearing
to delay the pesticide's removal from the market. Therefore, to pro-
tect the public and the environment from unnecessarily prolonged
"unreasonably adverse effects" and to ensure against unnecessary
administrative delay and a waste of administrative resources, it is in
the government's best interest to suspend a pesticide's registration
pending the completion of the cancellation hearing.
Weighing the above three factors, it seems clear that when the
EPA, after the process of Special Review, determines that a pesticide
causes "unreasonable adverse effects" and should be cancelled, it
can suspend the registration of a pesticide during a cancellation
hearing without depriving the registrant of constitutional due pro-
cess. Nevertheless, due process still requires some kind of post-
deprivation hearing.' 7 3
Finally, due process "does not necessarily demand all the es-
sentials of a judicial trial in every case."' 74 The courts usually have
employed a cost-benefit analysis "comparing the benefit of the pro-
cedural safeguard sought ... with the cost of the safeguard"' 175 to
determine the procedures required. 176 Usually, the more serious
the consequences of a property deprivation, the more formal the
procedures required. 77 Although the cancellation of a pesticide re-
gistration may not be as serious as a deprivation of welfare benefits,
voke any due process protection. See Industrial Safety Equip. Ass'n v. EPA, 837 F.2d
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
171. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
172. See SPECIAL REVIEW SUSPENSION/CANCELLATION HEARINGS, supra note 141.
173. See Barchi, 443 U.S. at 66; Matthews, 424 U.S. at 333.
174. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 153, § 5.31, at 267.
175. Sutton v. Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 1982); see also B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 153, § 5.31, at 267.
176. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 153, § 5.31, at 268.
177. Id.
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a cancellation is a complete deprivation of a registrant's property
right in that registration. As such, the procedures demanded by due
process may require a meaningful evidentiary hearing with the
rights to appear, to present evidence, and to call and examine wit-
nesses.178 The Agency or a reviewing court may conduct this evi-
dentiary hearing if the review is de novo.1 79 The registrant would
have an interest in an expeditious resolution of the hearing because
the pesticide would be suspended during the time of the hearing. It
is doubtful that the registrant would request such a hearing unless
there is an issue that genuinely needs to be raised.
IV. A MORE RESPONSIVE FIFRA
A. Proposed Amendments
As of this writing, there are several bills before Congress to
amend FIFRA. These include H.R. 3153,80 H.R. 3292,11 and a
proposal by the Bush administration.'
1. H.R. 3153.-H.R. 3153 would amend FIFRA to allow the
cancellation of a pesticide registration whenever there is a "reason-
able probability that the pesticide causes unreasonable adverse ef-
fects on the environment."' 8s3 Furthermore, any interested person
could petition the EPA for cancellation.' 8 4 The process of cancella-
tion would require the EPA to give advance notice of cancellation to
the USDA and to the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) if human health concerns are involved, and there would be
no deadline for consultation with either of these agencies.1 8 5 The
bill would require publication of notice of a proposed cancellation
order, a sixty-day comment period, and review by the USDA, the
HHS, and SAP.'8 6 Cancellation would become final upon publica-
178. See id. at 269.
179. Id. § 5.9, at 221; see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 n.10 (1975).
180. H.R. 3153, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 11, 1989 version) (originally introduced
Aug. 4, 1989).
181. H.R. 3292, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (as introduced Sept. 19, 1989).
182. Bush Administration Food Safety Plan, Proposed FIFRA Language (Feb. 5,
1990) (attached to cover letter from Roger B. Porter, Assistant to the President for Eco-
nomic and Domestic Policy to Senator Richard G. Lugar, dated Feb. 7, 1990) (copy on
file with Mayland Law Review) [hereinafter Bush Administration Proposal].
183. H.R. 3153, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (Aug. 11, 1989 version) (proposed 7 U.S.C.
§ 136d(b)(1)(A)(i)).
184. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(7)(A)).
185. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(l)(B)).
186. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(1)(C), (4)).
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tion of the final cancellation order in the Federal Register,'8 7 and the
cancellation decision would be reviewable in federal court."' While
the process of Special Review occurs prior to these cancellation pro-
cedures under existing law,'8 9 Special Review could occur concur-
rently with the cancellation procedure under H.R. 3153.19
Additionally, suspension under H.R. 3153 would be allowed
when the use of a pesticide generally causes unreasonable adverse
effects;' 9 ' however, these adverse effects need not manifest them-
selves in the amount of time generally required for cancellation. 92
An emergency suspension would be allowed if the Administrator de-
termines that the use of a pesticide is likely to result in an imminent
hazard.' 9" Cancellation need only be initiated within 180 days of
the emergency suspension order, and an emergency suspension
would be effective as soon as notice is sent to the registrant and
published in the Federal Register.'9 4 Finally, federal court review
would be based on the arbitrary or capricious standard. 195
2. H.R. 3292.-The requirements for cancellation under H.R.
3292 are more demanding than under H.R. 3153. While the Ad-
ministrator could cancel a pesticide "to assure that the pesticide...
does not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment,"' 1 I cancellation must be based on a validated test or some
other significant evidence that raises concerns of unreasonable ad-
verse effects.' 9 7 H.R. 3292 provides for an advance notice of the
proposed cancellation and then a notice of proposed cancella-
tion. 98 The advance notice provides a sixty-day comment period
while the notice of proposed cancellation provides for a ninety-day
187. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(5)(B)).
188. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(6)).
189. See 40 C.F.R § 154.1 (1989); House Comm. on Agriculture, side-by-side compar-
ison of major provisions of bills amending FIFRA, at 2 (undated but incorporating pro-
visions added as of Mar. 13, 1990) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review) [hereinafter
Side-by-Side Comparison].
190. H.R. 3153, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (Aug. 11, 1989 version) (proposed 7 U.S.C.
§ 136d(b)(l)(B)), Side-by-Side Comparison, supra note 189, at 2.
191. H.R. 3153, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (Aug. 11, 1989 version) (proposed 7 U.S.C.
§ 136d(c)(1)).
192. Compare id with 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1) (1988).
193. H.R. 3153, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (Aug. 11, 1989 version) (proposed 7 U.S.C.
§ 136d(d)(1)).
194. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(d)(1)(A)(B)).
195. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(d)(2)).
196. H.R. 3292, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (as introduced Sept. 19, 1989) (pro-
posed 7 U.S.C. 136d(b)(l)).
197. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(2)(A)).
198. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(3), (4), (6)).
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comment period; an informal hearing may be held after the close of
the ninety-day comment period. 199 The Administrator would not be
allowed to cancel a pesticide if alternatives are available to prevent
the risk at issue. 20 0 The final decision is reviewable in federal court,
and the registrant or any other interested person with the regis-
trant's permission may petition to revoke or amend a final cancella-
tion rule.2 0 ' Like H.R. 3153, H.R. 3292 provides that the Special
Review and cancellation procedures would occur concurrently. 20 2
Suspension under H.R. 3292 is essentially the same as that
under current law.203 The process for emergency suspension under
H.R. 3292, however, does not require initiation of cancellation prior
to suspension; it does require that the Administrator "proceed ex-
peditiously to issue a proposed [cancellation] rule. ' 2 °
3. The Bush Administration's Proposal.-The Bush administration
proposals for amending FIFRA do not change the current unreason-
able-adverse-effects standard for cancellation. The administration
proposal would require a prior consultation with the USDA and
HHS if human health concerns are involved and, like H.R. 3153,
there would be no deadline for consultation.20 5 A proposed order
of cancellation would be published in the Federal Register with at least
ninety days for public comment, and the EPA would have the discre-
tion to grant an informal hearing. 20 6 The proposed order would be
reviewed by the SAP, the USDA, and if there is a human health con-
cern, by the HHS. 2°7 A final order would be published in the Federal
Register and the decision could be reviewed in federal court.20 8 It is
uncertain, however, whether the period of Special Review would run
concurrently with the cancellation procedures under the administra-
tion proposal.20 9
The Bush proposal would allow suspension of a pesticide regis-
199. Id.
200. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(9)).
201. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(12), (13)).
202. See id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)), Side-by-Side Comparison,
supra note 189, at 2.
203. See H.R. 3292, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (as introduced Sept. 19, 1989) (pro-
posed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1)), Side-by-Side Comparison, supra note 189, at 2.
204. Id.
205. Bush Administration Proposal, supra note 182, at 2 (proposed 7 U.S.C.
§ 136d(b)(2)).
206. Id. at 3 (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(4)(B)).
207. Id. (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(4)(C)).
208. Side-by-Side Comparison, supra note 189, at 2.
209. Bush Administration Proposal, supra note 182, at 5-6 (proposed 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136d(b)(6)(B)(iv), 136d(b)(7)).
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tration when the Administrator "has prudent concerns that the use
of a pesticide results in unreasonable adverse effects on the environ-
ment."2 O Before suspension would occur, the continued use of the
pesticide during the time required for cancellation would have to
pose a substantial risk to the environment or human health and ex-
ceed the risk posed by alternate pesticides or it would have to cause
a significant lifetime risk that is unreasonable.2 1' The registrant or
any interested party with the registrant's permission could petition
the EPA within sixty days to have the suspension order reconsid-
ered, and the suspension would be reviewable in federal court. 12
B. The Need for a More Definite Threshold of Safety
While H.R. 3153, H.R. 3292, and the Bush administration pro-
posal are aimed at making FIFRA more responsive to health risk
concerns, all of these proposed amendments fall short of the mark.
The imminent-hazard standard is still vague and involves too much
agency discretion to regulate consistently and effectively the poten-
tially dangerous pesticides that enter the food supply. In addition,
the equally vague and highly discretionary unreasonable-adverse-ef-
fects standard used for purposes of cancellation has not been ade-
quately revised, and the public still is left wondering "how safe is
safe?" when it comes to assessing the risks of pesticides under
FIFRA. The EPA defends the vagueness of FIFRA's standards as a
way to "preserve flexibility to allow for the development of alterna-
tives in some cases and to accommodate changes in scientific opin-
ion and standards for adequate testing. '2 1 - When pressed, however,
the EPA has been able to deal with these changes in scientific opin-
ion and testing standards when enforcing other statutes that have
definite statutory or regulatory thresholds of what is safe-the
EPA's new ample-margin-of-safety policy under the Clean Air Act is
one such example. 214
In National Resources Defense Council v. EPA,215 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit required the EPA Admin-
istrator to set national emissions standards for hazardous air
pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act in two steps. 2 , 6
210. Id. at 12 (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136(l).
211. Id. at 12-13 (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136(l)(1)).
212. Id. at 11 (proposed 7 U.S.C. § 136(d)(c)(5)).
213. Highlights, supra note 136, at 5.
214. See infra notes 215-226 and accompanying text.
215. 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
216. Id. at 1164-66.
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The Administrator first must determine a "safe" or "acceptable"
level of risk considering only health factors and then must set a stan-
dard that provides an ample margin of safety considering health,
costs, feasibility, and other relevant factors.21 7 The EPA has since
ruled that to determine a safe level of risk, it will consider maximum
individual risk (MIR): the extent of the estimated risk of contracting
cancer "were an individual exposed to the maximum level of a pol-
lutant for a lifetime. ' 218 "If the risk to that individual is no higher
than approximately 1 in 10 thousand, that risk level is considered
acceptable and EPA then considers the other health and risk factors
to complete an overall judgment on acceptability. '21 9 The number
of persons "estimated to suffer cancer or other serious health effects
as a result of exposure to a pollutant" is an important factor in this
overall judgment on acceptability.220 "[E]ven if the MIR is low, the
overall risk may be unacceptable if significant numbers of persons
are exposed to a hazardous air pollutant." 2 2' The agency's judg-
ment on acceptability also will be influenced by whether the pollu-
tant is a known human carcinogen.222 Although the EPA has not
created a rigid standard for judging the acceptability of MIR, it has
provided a "starting point for the analysis in which a floor for the
ultimate standard is set." 223
The ample-margin-of-safety standard set at the second step is
the "legally enforceable limit that must be met by a regulated facil-
ity."'224 At this step, the EPA strives to protect the greatest number
of persons possible from contracting cancer-"an individual life-
time risk level no higher than approximately 1 in 1 million. ' 225 In
determining the ample margin of safety, however, the EPA may con-
sider "economic impacts of controls, technological feasibility, un-
certainties and any other relevant factors '2 26 in addition to health;
therefore, while the EPA may strive for a lifetime risk level no higher
than one in one million, the allowable risk may be greater once all
factors are considered. The EPA may not set the acceptable risk
217. Id.
218. 54 Fed. Reg. 38045 (1989).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 38045-46.
222. Id. at 38046.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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higher than the maximum individual risk set in the first step of the
process which is presumptively 1 in 10,000.
Regulating clean air and pesticides are certainly very different
endeavors. While smoke and other emissions may be filtered so as
to reduce carcinogenic particles in the ambient air, a carcinogenic
pesticide usually must be removed from the market. Nevertheless,
the public is as entitled to a safe food supply as it is to clean air and
the standards of risk for food and air should be equally stringent
and concrete. The Clean Air Act and its applicable regulations thus
provide a useful framework for amending FIFRA.
When a pesticide's carcinogenicity is in question, there should
be one level of suspension and the term imminent-hazard should
not include a consideration of economic benefits or the availability
of alternate pesticides as the EPA has proposed.2 27 Rather, FIFRA
only should allow the EPA to consider health factors when deter-
mining whether a pesticide poses an imminent hazard necessitating
suspension from the market pending cancellation proceedings.
FIFRA should establish a threshold at which a potentially carcino-
genic pesticide poses an imminent hazard to public health-if the
estimated risk of contracting cancer following a lifetime of exposure
to the pesticide (based on an average daily consumption rate228 or
inhalation rate in the case of farm workers, for example) is greater
than approximately 1 in 10,000, the pesticide should presumptively
pose an imminent hazard to public health. The greater than 1 in
10,000 risk threshold, although strongly presumptive, need not be
an absolutely inflexible standard. The EPA in its discretion could
find that a risk of 1 in 10,000 or less still poses an imminent hazard
to the public health when the incidence of cancer or other serious
health risks and the distribution of health risks in the exposed popu-
lation are considered. The strengths and weaknesses of scientific
studies also should be taken into account. For example, greater
weight might be accorded a known human carcinogen than those
extrapolated from animal studies. These same factors may lead the
227. Highlights, supra note 136, at 4, 12.
228. Scientists may disagree as to how they should determine figures such as an aver-
age daily consumption rate. See supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text. The
problems of scientific uncertainty may never be resolved; however, because the EPA no
longer has to make indemnity payments out of its own budget for economic losses suf-
fered by a registrant whose registration is cancelled or suspended and because the EPA
will receive more money from reregistration fees as a result of the 1988 amendments,
some are hopeful that the EPA will be better able to acquire the best technology and
more scientific help foi the testing of pesticides, thus mitigating the effects of scientific
uncertainty. See Ferguson & Gray, supra note 18, at 10076.
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Administrator to determine that an imminent hazard to human
health does not exist although the estimated risk of contracting can-
cer following a lifetime of exposure to the pesticide through average
daily consumption is greater than 1 in 10,000. Still, the 1 in 10,000
risk factor would be strongly presumptive, and it would be very diffi-
cult for the Administrator to conclude that a risk factor above 1 in
10,000 does not pose an imminent hazard to public health. "This
presumptive level comports with many previous health risk deci-
sions by EPA premised on controlling maximum individual risks to
approximately 1 in 10 thousand and below. 2 29
Moreover, the cancellation procedure could be initiated up to
ninety days after a suspension is ordered. To initiate the cancella-
tion procedure for a pesticide that may cause cancer in humans (a
procedure that could begin either in conjunction with or completely
separate from the suspension procedure as is the case under the
current FIFRA), the term "potentially unreasonable adverse effects"
on the public health would not include a consideration of the eco-
nomic benefits of the pesticide's continued use. As in the suspen-
sion process, only health effects could be considered. Potentially
unreasonable adverse effects on the public health presumptively
would exist if the estimated risk of contracting cancer following a
lifetime of exposure to the pesticide (based on an average daily con-
sumption rate and inhalation rate, for example) is greater than one
in one million. This greater than one in one million thresh6ld,
although strongly presumptive, would not preclude agency discre-
tion as to what constitutes potentially unreasonable adverse effects
to the public health. As in the suspension process described above,
the Administrator could consider the incidence of cancer or other
serious health risks, the distribution of health risks in the exposed
population, and the strengths and weaknesses of the scientific stud-
ies. The one in one million risk factor should be strongly presump-
tive, however, and it would be very difficult for the Administrator to
conclude that a one in one million risk of cancer does not pose po-
tentially unreasonable adverse effects to the public health.
In determining whether it ultimately should cancel a pesticide's
registration, the EPA would be able to consider the economic and
social benefits of a pesticide's continued use, as well as its health
risks. The EPA's final determination of whether a pesticide poses
unreasonable adverse effects to the public health should be influ-
enced strongly by health considerations and the threshold that
229. 54 Fed. Reg. at 38046 (1989).
1990] 1003
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
prompted the initiation of cancellation procedures. Moreover, the
greater the health risk over the one in one million risk threshold, the
greater the weight that should be accorded the pesticide's risks
when balanced against the benefits of its continued use.
The above proposal for amending FIFRA would be applicable
only to those pesticides that are actual or possible human carcino-
gens. The noncarcinogenic human health risks or risks to the envi-
ronment that pesticides pose should be evaluated under a
nonthreshold risk-benefit approach. Under this approach, the Ad-
ministrator would be able to cancel a pesticide registration to insure
that the pesticide does not generally cause unreasonable adverse ef-
fects on the environment, considering both the risks and benefits of
the pesticide as under the current FIFRA. An imminent hazard still
would be required for suspending a pesticide registration pending
cancellation; however, suspension would be allowed when the use of
a pesticide generally causes unreasonable adverse effects on human
health or the rest of the environment during the pendency of the
cancellation. Only the risks of the pesticide's continued use during
the pendency of the cancellation would have to be considered. The
decision to suspend would become effective when notice of the sus-
pension is sent to the registrant and published in the Federal Register.
The reason for this dichotomy between carcinogenic and non-
carcinogenic pesticides is two-fold. First, it may be very difficult and
perhaps ridiculous to establish a risk threshold for many health and
environmental hazards. For example, it would be very difficult to
set a risk threshold regarding the number of fish that must die due
to the run-off of a pesticide into a pond before that pesticide is de-
clared to pose unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. It
would be equally ridiculous and perhaps impossible to set a thresh-
old on the number of severe headaches a pesticide can cause in the
population before an imminent hazard to human health exists. A
certain amount of discretion by the Agency in risk-benefit situations
such as these is both necessary and desirable. For health risks like
cancer, which the EPA has been able to quantify, a less discretionary
threshold approach is more desirable; both the EPA and the public
would be more aware of the "acceptable" levels of risk that can be
imposed on the public health.
Second, this threshold approach is consistent with the proposed
revisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, (FFDCA)
which, among other things, regulates the amount of pesticide resi-
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dues allowed in food.23 ° Under the Administration's plan, the level
of pesticide residues that pose a cancer risk to humans, and are al-
lowed in both raw and processed vegetables, would be set according
to a negligible-risk standard.2 ' This standard would establish a
flexible threshold of safety: the administration proposal has sug-
gested a lifetime risk of one in one million for long term health risks
like cancer.2 " While a tolerance level posing greater than negligi-
ble risks may be allowed when economic impacts on consumers and
producers as well as public health are taken into consideration, the
negligible-risk standard would put a bit more certainty into the risk
assessment process and attempt to resolve the current inconsisten-
cies within the FFDCA.
C. A More Efficient Hearing Process
The only hearings that should be afforded a registrant during
the suspension and cancellation processes are those hearings re-
quired by due process. Accordingly, there need be no opportunity
for a trial-type hearing required prior to the suspension of a regis-
tered pesticide. 33 There would be an opportunity for judicial re-
view of the suspension only to determine if the decision to suspend
was arbitrary and capricious. To prevent any unnecessary delay in
cancelling or otherwise restricting the use of a suspended pesticide,
cancellation procedures would be initiated within ninety days of
sending the suspension notice to the registrant. The registrant
would be able to request an agency hearing challenging the Admin-
istrator's final decision to cancel.
To begin the cancellation procedure (which can be conducted
in conjunction with or separately from the suspension procedure),
the registrant, USDA, FDA, and HHS would be given thirty-days no-
tice before the proposed notice of intent to cancel is published to
230. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a) (1988). The registration process under FIFRA is closely
linked with the tolerance setting process under the FFDCA.
Pesticides that are to be registered for use on food crops must be granted toler-
ances under the [FFDCA]. Tolerances authorize and place legal limits on the
presence of pesticide residues in or on raw agricultural commodities and, in
appropriate cases, processed foods. The EPA will not register the use of a pes-
ticide on food crops unless tolerances first have been granted to cover any resi-
dues expected to remain in or on the food.
COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC AND REGULATORY ISSUES UNDERLYING PESTICIDE USE PATrERNS
AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REGULATING PESTICIDES
IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADox 23-24 (1987).
231. Bush Administration Proposal, supra note 182, at 37-38, 48-49.
232. Id. at 48.
233. See supra notes 146-179 and accompanying text.
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prepare for the notice and comment period. There would then be a
notice and comment period lasting 120 days from the day that the
proposed cancellation and the reasons behind it are announced in
the Federal Register. During this 120-day period, the burden would
be on the registrant, the USDA, and any other interested party to
present information to the EPA regarding the pesticide's benefits
(including social and economic factors), as well as any scientific
studies or data regarding the pesticide's carcinogenic or other ef-
fects. Any interested party also could submit information regarding
the risks or benefits of the pesticide's continued use. At the end of
the 120-day period, the EPA would have 30 days to consider the
risks and benefits of the pesticide's continued use and to publish
both a written notice in the Federal Register of its intention to cancel
or continue the pesticide's registration and an account of the risks
and benefits considered in the decision. The registrant could chal-
lenge the final agency decision in an evidentiary hearing conducted
by the Agency. If the pesticide has not already been suspended or
voluntarily withdrawn from the market by the registrant, the Admin-
istrator could suspend the pesticide registration pending the final
outcome of the cancellation hearing.
CONCLUSION
There are those who believe that the EPA should have as much
discretion in the risk assessment process as possible (as under the
current FIFRA) because it is the most realistic and sensible way to
regulate potentially hazardous chemicals in the highly complex
world in which we live. These people may argue that we voluntarily
accept risk every day-by driving a car, smoking, or building a house
on the San Andreas fault-because we realize that to live ourlives,
we often must balance the risks against the benefits of our ac-
tions.134 Accordingly, the argument goes, we should not be loath to
accept a risk-benefit approach to regulating our food supply. None-
theless, there is something inherently disturbing about having a can-
cer risk imposed on you by a regulatory agency that may be bowing
to political pressures. It is even more disturbing that someone close
to you may have had his or her life balanced away against the eco-
nomic benefits of keeping the color of apples uniformly red. Picking
up a fruit or vegetable at the grocery store becomes a game of car-
cinogen roulette in which no consumer really knows the dangers of
what he or she is eating.
234. Sagoff, On Marets of Risk, 41 MD. L. REV. 755 (1982).
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It may be inevitable that we must consider the economic bene-
fits as well as health risks when determining whether a pesticide
should be taken off the market. The world is a complex place in
which the loss of a fruit or vegetable crop to pests even for one
season could have a profound effect on the availability and prices of
food in this country and a devastating effect on the farmers who
grow the failed crop. To protect the public health, however, espe-
cially from diseases like cancer, there must be some safety threshold"
established (albeit not too rigid) as well as a more efficient way to
remove dangerous pesticides from the market. These proposals are
intended to facilitate more consistent and efficient pesticide regula-
tion, to provide the Agency with a realistic and appropriate amount
of discretion, and to give the public a more concrete understanding
of, and more confidence in the standards and procedures that the
EPA uses to protect the public health and safety from the dangers of
pesticides.
MARINA M. LOLLEY*
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